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Bank Capital Requirements for 
Market Risk: The Internal Models 
Approach
Darryll Hendricks and Beverly Hirtle*
he increased prominence of trading activities
at many large banking companies has high-
lighted bank exposure to market risk—the
risk of loss from adverse movements in finan-
cial market rates and prices. Recognizing the importance
of trading operations, banks have sought ways to measure
and to manage the associated risks. At the same time, bank
supervisors in the United States and abroad have taken
steps to ensure that banks have adequate internal controls
and capital resources to address these risks.
Prominent among the steps taken by supervisors is
the development of formal capital requirements for the
market risk exposures arising from banks’ trading activi-
ties. These market risk capital requirements, which will
take full effect in January 1998, depart from earlier capital
rules in two notable ways. First, the capital charge is based
on the output of a bank’s internal risk measurement model
rather than on an externally imposed supervisory measure.
Second, the capital requirements incorporate qualitative
standards for a bank’s risk measurement system.
This paper presents an overview of the new capital
requirements. In the first section, we describe the structure
of the requirements and the considerations that went into
their design. In addition, we address some of the concerns
that have been raised about the methods of calculating cap-
ital charges under the new rules. The paper’s second section
considers the probable impact of the market risk capital
requirements. After performing a set of rough calculations
to show that the effect of the internal models approach on
required capital levels and capital ratios will probably be
modest, we identify some significant benefits of the new
approach. Most notably, the approach will lead to regula-
tory capital charges that conform more closely to banks’
true risk exposures. Moreover, the information generated
by the models will allow supervisors and financial market
participants to compare risk exposures over time and across
institutions.
*Darryll Hendricks and Beverly Hirtle are vice presidents at the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York.
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THE STRUCTURE OF THE MARKET RISK 
CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS
The new capital requirements for market risk have been
put forward as an amendment to existing capital rules. In
late 1990, banks and bank holding companies in the
United States became subject to a set of regulatory capital
guidelines that defined minimum amounts of capital to
be held against various categories of on- and off-balance-
sheet positions.1 The guidelines also specified which debt
and equity instruments on a bank’s balance sheet qualified
as regulatory capital. These guidelines were based on the
1988 Basle Accord adopted by the Basle Committee on
Banking Supervision, a group made up of bank supervisors
from the Group of Ten countries. 
While the original Basle Accord and U.S. risk-
based capital guidelines primarily addressed banks’
exposure to credit risk, the new requirements set minimum
capital standards for banks’ market risk exposure.2 Broadly
speaking, market risk is the risk of loss from adverse
movements in the market values of assets, liabilities, or
off-balance-sheet positions. Market risk generally arises
from movements in the underlying risk factors—interest
rates, exchange rates, equity prices, or commodity prices—
that affect the value of these on- and off-balance-sheet
positions. Thus, a bank’s market risk exposure is deter-
mined both by the volatility of underlying risk factors and
the sensitivity of the bank’s portfolio to movements in
those risk factors. 
Banks face market risk from the full range of
positions held in their portfolios, but the capital stan-
dards focus largely on the market risks arising from
banks’ trading activities.3 This focus reflects the idea
that market risk is a major component of the risks aris-
ing from trading activities and, further, that market risk
exposures are more visible and more easily measured
within the trading portfolio because these positions are
marked to market daily. Thus, under the amended capital
standards, positions in a bank’s trading book are subject
to the market risk capital requirements but are exempt
from the original risk-based capital charges for credit risk
exposure.4 In addition, commodity and foreign exchange
positions held throughout the institution (both inside
and outside the trading account) are subject to the market
risk capital requirements.
Because the capital standards principally address
the market risk arising from trading activities, only those
U.S. banks and bank holding companies with significant
amounts of trading activity are subject to the market risk
requirements. In particular, the U.S. standards apply to
banks and bank holding companies with trading account
positions (assets plus liabilities) exceeding $1 billion
or 10 percent of total assets. The institutions meeting
these criteria, while relatively few in number, account for
the vast majority of trading positions held by U.S. banks.5
Supervisors also have the discretion to impose the standards
on institutions that do not meet these criteria if such a step
appears necessary for safety and soundness reasons. The
rules become effective as of January 1998, although the
U.S. regulation also permits banks to elect early adoption
during 1997.
INNOVATIVE FEATURES
The market risk capital standards have drawn considerable
attention because they differ significantly in approach from
the risk-based capital rules for credit risk. The market risk
standards impose a quantitative minimum capital charge
that is calculated for each bank using the output of that
bank’s internal risk measurement model; they also establish
a set of qualitative standards for the measurement and
management of market risk. In both regards, the capital
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standards break new ground. By substituting banks’ inter-
nal risk measurement models for broad, uniform regulatory
measures of risk exposure, this approach should lead to
capital charges that more accurately reflect individual banks’
true risk exposures. And by including qualitative standards,
the approach is consistent with the shift in supervisory
interest from a focus on risk measurement to a more com-
prehensive evaluation of banks’ overall risk management. 
The qualitative standards are designed to incor-
porate basic principles of sound risk management in the
capital requirements. Any bank or bank holding com-
pany subject to the market risk capital requirements
must be able to demonstrate that it has a conceptually
sound risk measurement system that is implemented
with integrity. The risk estimates produced must be
closely integrated with the risk management process: for
example, management could rely on daily reports from
the system to assess current strategy or could base its
limit structure on the risk estimates. In addition, the
bank must conduct periodic stress tests of its portfolio
to gauge the impact of extreme market conditions.
Further, the bank must have a risk control unit that is
fully independent of the business units that generate
market risk exposures. Finally, internal and/or external
auditors must conduct an independent review of the
bank’s risk management and measurement process.
The quantitative capital requirements distin-
guish between general market risk and specific risk. As
defined in the capital standards, general market risk is
the risk arising from movements in the general level of
underlying risk factors such as interest rates, exchange
rates, equity prices, and commodity prices. Specific risk
is defined as the risk of an adverse movement in the
price of an individual security resulting from factors
related to the security’s issuer. At one level, general and
specific market risk are analogous to systematic and
nonsystematic risk in a standard asset-pricing framework.
Specific risk, however, is intended to cover variation both
from day-to-day price fluctuations and from surprise
events, such as an unexpected bond default. The following
subsections provide an overview of the capital treatment
of the two types of risk.
CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS FOR GENERAL 
MARKET RISK
The capital requirements for general market risk are based
on the output of a bank’s internal value-at-risk model, cali-
brated to a common supervisory standard. In brief, a value-
at-risk model produces an estimate of the maximum
amount that the bank can lose on a particular portfolio over
a given holding period with a given degree of statistical
confidence.6 Although there are a variety of empirical
approaches to calculating value at risk, estimates are almost
always derived from the behavior of underlying risk factors
(such as interest rates and exchange rates) during a recent
historical observation period.
The general market risk capital requirement is
based on value-at-risk estimates calibrated to a ten-day,
99th percentile standard. That is, if the ten-day, 99th per-
centile value-at-risk estimate is equal to $100, then the
bank would expect to lose more than $100 on only 1 out
of 100 ten-day periods. The common supervisory standard
is imposed to ensure that the capital charge entails a
consistent prudential level across banks. The value-at-risk
estimates must be calculated on a daily basis using a mini-
mum historical observation period of one year, or the
equivalent of one year if observations are weighted over
time. The capital charge for general market risk is equal to
the average value-at-risk estimate over the previous sixty
trading days (approximately one quarter of the trading
year) multiplied by a “scaling factor,” which is generally
equal to three.7
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Several aspects of this calculation have generated
considerable discussion, and thus it is worth taking a
moment to consider them further. First, the ten-day hold-
ing period has been criticized as being overly conservative,
since under normal market conditions, many positions in a
bank’s trading portfolio could be liquidated in less than
this amount of time.8 The ten-day standard, however, also
reflects the need to address the risks posed by options and
other positions with nonlinear price characteristics.
Because options’ sensitivities to changes in market risk
factors can grow at a rate that is disproportionate to the
size of changes in the risk factors, a longer holding period
can reveal risk exposures that might not be evident with
the smaller risk factor movements associated with shorter
holding periods. Thus, the choice of a ten-day holding
period stems from the view that the value-at-risk estimates
used in the capital calculation should incorporate the impact
of instantaneous ten-day-sized price moves in the market
risk factors. In the language of options, the ten-day holding
period serves to calibrate the coverage of “gamma” risk.9
Second, the minimum historical observation
period has come under question. Critics characterize the
year-long minimum as intrusive and argue that longer
observation periods have not been shown to result in more
accurate value-at-risk estimates. In fact, however, the mini-
mum historical observation period requirement primarily
reflects concerns about the variability of the capital
requirement across institutions, rather than a judgment by
supervisors about the historical observation period
likely to produce the most accurate value-at-risk estimates
for capital or risk management purposes.10
The basic idea behind this requirement is that
banks with similar risk exposures should face similar capi-
tal charges. In this regard, empirical evidence suggests that
shorter observation periods tend to generate value-at-risk
estimates that are more volatile over time (Hendricks
1996). Thus, for a set of banks with similar risk exposures,
this result implies that the dispersion of value-at-risk
estimates across banks will tend to be greater when some
of the banks are using short observation periods. The mini-
mum one-year historical observation period is an attempt
to limit this disparity.
A third element of the new capital requirements
that has proved controversial—indeed, more controversial
than any other element—is the scaling factor. The scaling
factor has been criticized as an ad hoc supervisory adjust-
ment that undercuts the benefits of basing a capital charge
on banks’ internal models. In this view, the key advantage
of using internal risk measurement models is that they
provide more accurate measures of an individual bank’s
risk exposure than do broad supervisory measures. Accord-
ingly, some have argued that a bank that can demonstrate
convincingly that its model is accurate should be subject
to a scaling factor of one.
In considering this argument, however, it is impor-
tant to recognize that the overall purpose of the scaling
factor is to produce the desired degree of coverage for the
market risk capital charge. The market risk capital require-
ments are intended to ensure that banks hold sufficient
capital to withstand the consequences of prolonged and/or
severe adverse movements in the market rates and prices
affecting the value of their trading portfolios. The key
assumption behind the internal models approach is that a
value-at-risk estimate calibrated to a ten-day, 99th percen-
tile standard is well correlated with the degree of such risk
inherent in the portfolio, and thus is a reasonable base for a
minimum capital standard.
Nonetheless, by itself, even a perfectly measured
ten-day, 99th percentile value-at-risk figure may not pro-
vide a sufficient degree of risk coverage to serve as a
prudent capital standard. For one, such a standard implies
that a bank is expected to have trading portfolio losses that
exceed its required capital in one ten-day period out of a
hundred, or about once every four years. An environment
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in which banks depleted their market risk capital so
frequently could be highly unstable, particularly if such
events happened to many banks at the same time (which
could occur if banks adopted similar trading strategies).
Further, value-at-risk estimates based only on recent his-
torical market data may not incorporate the possibility of
severe market events. Thus, a capital standard based on
unadjusted value-at-risk estimates might not provide suffi-
cient capital for a bank to withstand the effects of market
breaks or unanticipated regime shifts.
The role of the scaling factor is to translate the
value-at-risk estimates into an appropriate minimum
capital requirement, reflecting considerations both about
the accuracy of a bank’s value-at-risk model and about
prudent capital coverage. The capital cushion should
cover possible losses due to market risk over a reasonable
capital planning horizon—which is generally seen to
reflect a period between one quarter and one year—while
at the same time reflecting the fact that banks’ trading
positions change rapidly over time. As an alternative to
the scaling factor, supervisors could have based the capital
charge on value-at-risk estimates calibrated to a very
stringent prudential standard (for example, a one-year
holding period or a 99.999th percentile standard). In
practice, however, it is very difficult to derive reliable and
verifiable value-at-risk estimates for such extreme param-
eter values. Actual observations of such “tail events” are
few, greatly complicating the task of verifying that any
model is accurately measuring the probability of these
occurrences. Thus, instead of representing a more “scien-
tific” alternative to the scaling factor, a requirement of this
kind would simply introduce a false sense of precision into
the capital standards.
By contrast, the scaling factor has the advantage of
being simple and easy to implement. It does not require
banks to make (or supervisors to evaluate) complex calcula-
tions intended to model rare or as yet unobserved events,
such as regime shifts or market breaks. At the same time,
however, it does seek to provide a capital cushion against
such incidents. In addition, it is similar to the techniques
used by some banks for internal capital allocation, in which
one-day value-at-risk estimates are extrapolated to a much
longer holding period (for example, six months or one year)
by multiplying by the square root of time (in the case
of ten-day value-at-risk estimates, this calculation for a
one-year holding period implies a multiplication factor of
five). Moreover, comparisons of ten-day, 99th percentile
value-at-risk estimates with banks’ actual daily trading
results suggest that the scaling factor of three provides an
adequate level of capital coverage. The results of bank
stress-testing programs were also a key input in the
decision to use a scaling factor of three.
For additional protection, the market risk capital
requirements incorporate a feature intended to ensure that
models that systematically underestimate risk exposures
are subject to a higher multiplication factor. This feature is
the so-called backtesting requirement. Backtesting is a
process of confirming the accuracy of value-at-risk models
by comparing value-at-risk estimates with subsequent
trading outcomes. For instance, an accurate model will
produce one-day, 99th percentile value-at-risk estimates
that are exceeded by actual trading losses only 1 percent of
the time. 
The backtesting procedures in the market risk
capital requirements use a very simple statistical test based
on the number of times during a year that trading losses
exceed value-at-risk estimates. For purposes of the back-
test, banks will compare daily end-of-day value-at-risk
estimates calibrated to a one-day, 99th percentile standard
with the next day’s trading outcome. Each instance in
which a trading loss exceeds the value-at-risk estimate is
termed an exception. Since it is unlikely that an accu-
rate model would produce a large number of exceptions,
banks with five or more exceptions over a one-year period
are subject to a higher scaling factor. The increase in the
scaling factor is as large as 33 percent (from three to four)
for banks with a very large number of exceptions. 
The introduction of the higher scaling factor for
banks experiencing five or more exceptions is based on a
simple statistical technique that calculates the probability
that an accurate value-at-risk model would generate a
given number of exceptions during a year of trading days.
In theory, these probabilities are independent of the design
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is used as the starting point for the higher scaling factor
across all banks. Overall, the backtest is calibrated to
ensure that a bank with an accurate value-at-risk model is
very unlikely to face an increased scaling factor. The rela-
tionship between the number of exceptions and the scaling
factor is reported in Table 1.11
For technical reasons, the backtests conducted by
banks may deviate from the ideal conditions assumed in
the statistical derivation. For one, the trading gains and
losses used in the backtest calculation may be based on the
actual trading outcomes booked by the bank, and in that
case will include fee income and the profits and losses from
intraday trading. This means that the profit and loss fig-
ures used in the backtest could reflect influences not
incorporated into the value-at-risk model, potentially
introducing bias into the backtest results. The direction of
the bias is not clear, however. On the one hand, including
fee income in the profit and loss figures will tend to reduce
the number of exceptions identified. On the other hand,
the impact of intraday trading will likely increase the vola-
tility of the daily profit and loss figures relative to the
value-at-risk estimates, increasing the probability of an
exception. 
One possible response would be to require banks
to calculate hypothetical profit and loss figures by holding
end-of-day positions constant and excluding fee income.
This calculation could become quite burdensome, however.
For this reason, and because the use of actual profit and loss
figures in the backtest does not produce a clear bias in the
test, banks are allowed to use the profit and loss informa-
tion already at hand.
Finally, the backtest is calibrated to a one-day
standard, whereas the value-at-risk estimates used for
capital purposes are calibrated to a ten-day standard.
Many commentators have pointed out that this differ-
ence introduces a discrepancy between the value-at-risk
estimates validated in the backtest and the estimate
actually used for capital purposes. Once again, the rea-
soning behind this specification reflects the practical
limitations of testing value-at-risk estimates calibrated
to a ten-day standard: backtesting such estimates would
require a significant amount of historical data to generate
a series of independent ten-day profit and loss figures.
With only a limited number of such observations—just
twenty-six over a one-year horizon—the power of the
backtest to distinguish between accurate and inaccurate
models is very limited. Thus, the supervisory backtest is
calibrated to a one-day standard to strike a balance
between the need to have a sufficient amount of data
to give the backtest statistical power and the desire to
determine the accuracy of the value-at-risk model used
in the capital calculations.
CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS FOR SPECIFIC RISK
As noted earlier, the capital requirements for specific risk
are intended to cover the risk of adverse price movements
stemming from factors related to the issuer of an individual
security. Thus, debt and equity positions in bank trading
portfolios are assumed to be subject to specific risk. Under
the original risk-based capital guidelines put forth in
1988, long debt and equity positions in a trading portfo-
lio were subject to capital charges ranging from 0 percent
(for government securities) to 8 percent (for corporate debt
and equity) of the book value of the positions. Under the
amended guidelines, both long and short debt and equity
positions are covered by the market risk capital require-
ment for specific risk. 
Banks whose value-at-risk models incorporate
specific risk can use the specific risk estimates generated
Table 1 
BACKTESTING AND THE SCALING FACTOR
Number of Exceptions
(Out of 250 Trading Days)
Scaling   
Factor
     Cumulative 
     Probability 
     (Percent)




Note:  The “cumulative probability” column reports the probability that an 
accurate model would generate more than the number of exceptions reported in 
the first column.  These figures are generated using a binomial distribution, 
assuming a sample size of 250 trading days.  For the purpose of the backtest, an 
accurate model is one that produces an accurate estimate of the 99th percentile 
of the distribution of one-day trading gains and losses.  Thus, an accurate 
value-at-risk model will produce more than five exceptions over a 250-day 
trading period 4.12 percent of the time. 
8 3.75 0.11
9 3.85 0.03
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by their models.12 Under the most recent announcement
by the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision (1997),
these model-based specific risk estimates are subject to a
scaling factor of four until market practice evolves and
banks can demonstrate that their models of specific risk
adequately address both idiosyncratic risks and “event risks”
that might not be captured in a value-at-risk model.13
This provision holds out the prospect of harmonizing the
specific risk capital requirements fully with the general
market risk requirements as market practices with respect
to positions subject to significant event risks become
clearer. This approach is consistent with the view that
there is no compelling conceptual reason to separate mar-
ket risk into a general and a specific portion in a value-at-
risk model, or to apply different standards to one portion
than to another.
IMPACT OF THE CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS
EFFECT ON CAPITAL LEVELS AND CAPITAL RATIOS
How the market risk requirements will affect banks’
required capital ratios is difficult to calculate precisely with
the data currently in the public domain. Such calculations
require both information on banks’ value-at-risk estimates—
calibrated to the ten-day, 99th percentile supervisory
standard—and information about the distribution of
trading assets and liabilities among various specific risk cat-
egories. Despite the lack of such data, however, it is possible
to make a rough estimate of the impact of the capital charge
by using information reported in banks’ annual reports.
Table 2 reports 1996 average value-at-risk esti-
mates for a sample of large bank holding companies that
presented annual average value-at-risk estimates in their
1996 annual reports along with sufficient descriptive detail
to identify the holding period and percentile underlying
the estimate.14 As indicated in Table 2, all of the estimates
were based on a one-day holding period, with percentiles
ranging from the 95th to the 99th. The divergence in these
parameters, as well as in other aspects of the estimates such
as correlation assumptions, makes direct comparisons of
these figures across institutions difficult.
Nevertheless, these figures suggest that the
impact of the market risk capital charge on required capital
levels and capital ratios is likely to be quite small. Using
these numbers, we calculate that the estimated increase in
the level of required capital from the general market risk
component of the new capital charge ranges roughly
between 1.5 and 7.5 percent for these banking companies.
We find that the impact on the capital ratios is also fairly
modest, with an average decline of about 30 basis points
and 40 basis points in the tier 1 and total capital ratios,
respectively. These calculations are at best rough estimates,
however, and could differ significantly from the actual
impact of the capital charge at the time it becomes effec-
tive. Such differences would reflect both estimation error in
translating the reported figures to the supervisory stan-
Banks whose value-at-risk models 
incorporate specific risk can use the specific 
risk estimates generated by their models. . . . 
These model-based specific risk estimates are 
subject to a scaling factor of four.
Table 2 
1996 ANNUAL AVERAGE VALUE-AT-RISK ESTIMATES










BankAmerica  42a 97.5 1 day
Bankers Trust 39 99.0 1 day
Note:  The average 1996 value-at-risk (VAR) figures are drawn from the 
companies’ 1996 annual reports.  
a Figure assumes a correlation of one between broad risk categories. The
comparable figure assuming a correlation of zero is $18 million. 
b Figure is based on the volatility of actual daily trading results, as reported in 
the 1996 annual report.  
c The 2  VAR figure is equivalent to the 97.7th percentile under a normal 
distribution.
Chase Manhattan  24b 95.0 1 day
Citicorp  45c 2 1 day
J.P. Morgan 21 95.0 1 day
s
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dards and changes in the bank holding companies’ portfo-
lios over time.
Once we account for the capital treatment of
specific risk, the overall impact of the market risk capital
charge is likely to be even smaller than our calculations
suggest. As noted earlier, many traded debt and equity
positions subject to the credit risk capital requirements
under the original capital guidelines are now subject to
specific risk capital requirements based on the output of
banks’ internal models. This “specific risk carve-out” will
offset the impact of the additional general market risk
capital charge, possibly to a considerable degree. Unfortu-
nately, the data needed to make reasonably precise estimates
of this effect are not currently available. However, given the
significant positions that some institutions hold in instru-
ments that will become subject to the specific risk capital
requirements, this carve-out may well result in a net
reduction in required capital levels for some institutions.
ADVANTAGES OF THE INTERNAL MODELS 
APPROACH
Whatever the effect of the new standards on the level of
overall required capital, capital requirements based on
internal models should produce minimum regulatory
capital charges that more closely match banks’ true risk
exposures. This closer relationship is important not only
for determining the risk facing an institution at a particu-
lar moment in time, but also for tracing the evolution of
risk over time. That is, while the value-at-risk estimates
underlying the market risk capital charge are useful for
assessing the level of risk undertaken by a bank or bank
holding company at a given moment, they are potentially
even more beneficial for understanding changes in risk
exposure over time. By extension, the key benefit of the
market risk capital charge is that the required capital levels
will evolve with risk exposures over time.
In addition to tightening the link between risk
exposures and capital requirements, a capital charge based
on internal models may provide supervisors and the
financial markets with a consistent framework for making
comparisons across institutions. As the information in
Table 2 makes clear, the value-at-risk figures presented in
the annual reports of various bank holding companies are
calculated using different parameters, especially the
percentile of the loss distribution. These differences make
comparisons across institutions difficult without additional
calculations to convert the figures to a common basis.
Typically, these calculations require assumptions that may
be only approximately correct, introducing additional
noise in the comparisons. 
By contrast, the market risk capital charge pro-
vides a common standard for value-at-risk estimates that
makes comparisons across institutions easier and more
reliable. The value-at-risk estimates underlying banks’
capital charges will be based on a uniform set of prudential
parameters and will accurately reflect the assumptions and
specifications of each bank’s internal model (rather than an
external approximation). Further, the financial markets
may gain information about the performance and accuracy
of these models over time if banks make public the results
of their backtests. While disclosure of the details of these
results is purely discretionary, this backtesting information
is consistent with the type of disclosures about market
risks advocated in several recent discussion papers (see
Bank for International Settlements [1994] and Federal
Reserve Bank of New York [1994] for two examples). 
CHALLENGES FOR SUPERVISORS
The actual benefits to be derived from the value-at-risk
estimates depend crucially on the quality and accuracy of
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the models on which the estimates are based. To the extent
that these models are inaccurate and misstate banks’ true
risk exposures, then the quality of the information derived
from any public disclosure will be degraded. More impor-
tant, inaccurate value-at-risk models or models that do not
produce consistent estimates over time will undercut the
main benefit of a models-based capital requirement: the
closer tie between capital requirements and true risk
exposures. Thus, assessment of the accuracy of these
models is a key concern for supervisors.
The discussion of value-at-risk models in this
paper might suggest that supervisory evaluation of banks’
internal models is a daunting task, necessitating the hiring
of large numbers of new staff with the same degree of
technical and market expertise as the bank personnel
responsible for developing and implementing the models.
This interpretation is somewhat mistaken, however.
Although the task of assessing value-at-risk models
requires supervisors to maintain staff with a high degree of
technical skill and experience in reviewing banks’ trading
operations, it is largely an extension of the activities
routinely performed by U.S. bank supervisors in overseeing
the trading operations of major banks. These activities have
typically entailed review and assessment of the accuracy
and appropriateness of the models used by banks for
pricing, risk management, and general ledger profit and
loss calculations. Thus, the basic procedures for evaluating
value-at-risk models are similar to those that have been
used by U.S. supervisors for some time in reviewing banks’
trading activities. The procedures followed by examiners
are also quite similar in spirit to the techniques used by
auditors and accountants to assess the accuracy of the books
and records of a banking institution. 
As a first step, supervisors can turn to the internal
auditing and certification processes used by the banks to
validate the accuracy and performance of their models. The
qualitative standards imposed by the market risk capital
guidelines require independent validation of any models
used to value positions or to measure the sensitivity of
portfolios to market risk. As we have seen, the standards
also call for an independent risk management unit and an
independent internal or external audit of a bank’s risk man-
agement processes. The results of these internal reviews
provide supervisors with a valuable starting point for
their own evaluation. The standards also mandate that
the models be used as an integral part of a bank’s risk man-
agement process—for instance, as part of daily manage-
ment reports or as the basis of the bank’s limit system.
Because the models are used for purposes that go well
beyond calculating regulatory capital levels, the inter-
ests of bank management in obtaining accurate value-at-
risk estimates may be more closely aligned with the inter-
ests of supervisors.
Backtesting results—both those generated as
required for supervisory capital purposes and additional
results generated by institutions for internal validation and
calibration—also provide supervisors with important
information about the accuracy of value-at-risk models.
Although the backtesting procedures incorporated in the
market risk capital requirements are based on relatively
simple statistical tests, researchers at the banks and
elsewhere are actively investigating how to use ex post
trading results to draw inferences about the accuracy and
performance of value-at-risk models (see Kupiec [1995],
Crnkovic and Drachman [1996], and Lopez [1997]). This
work may lead to better and more powerful techniques for
using these data to assess the accuracy of value-at-risk
models.
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In addition to drawing on these resources, supervi-
sors rely on a dialogue with risk management staff at the
bank in question and on a process of evaluating key
assumptions and parameters of the models. Both the
dialogue with the banks and the evaluation of the model
parameters depend on having supervisory staff that can
assess the technical work performed by a bank’s risk man-
agement and trading staff. But while developing and
retaining examiners with these skills is a key challenge for
supervisors, the task is likely to become easier over time.
Basic information about the structure and theoretical
underpinnings of value-at-risk models is spreading, and
the models are quickly becoming commonplace at financial
(and nonfinancial) institutions. An understanding of these
models is also emerging as a standard part of the skills
acquired through academic and on-the-job training in
finance and risk management. Thus, value-at-risk model-
ing is becoming a significantly less arcane area of both risk
management and supervisory oversight.
Taken together, these factors suggest that supervi-
sors have a broad arsenal of approaches to use in evaluating
value-at-risk models. While experience over time will
determine whether the information generated by these
models is consistent and reliable, there is good reason to
believe that the market risk capital requirements will yield
information that is useful to both supervisors and market
participants. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
Market risk capital requirements based on internal models
have drawn considerable attention since the initial proposal
for these requirements was released in 1995. During this
time, supervisory interest in value-at-risk models has
encouraged banks in the United States and abroad to direct
resources and attention toward the further development of
these models and their fuller integration with the risk
management process. 
In the coming years, some of the key issues facing
banks in value-at-risk modeling—and in risk management
more generally—will concern the extension of these mod-
els to cover a broader range of the risks facing banking
institutions. For example, can quantitative risk models be
applied to credit, operational, and legal risks? And if so,
should supervisors expand the use of their internal models
to derive capital charges for these exposures? Interestingly,
these issues have already surfaced in banks’ efforts to model
specific risk. Specific risk incorporates elements of both
market risk and credit risk. In measuring specific risk,
banks face a number of difficult technical and conceptual
problems—how to measure the probability and likely
impact of events that occur infrequently and how to quan-
tify the effects of complex events that depend on the inter-
related actions of many parties. These problems, which are
at the frontier of thinking about regulatory capital and
banks’ internal capital allocation, will need to be resolved
if quantitative risk models are to be used systematically to
gauge other forms of risk.
At present, banks and other financial institutions
are still in the early stages of developing methods for
quantifying other types of risk and for integrating these
risks into a unified capital allocation framework. Under-
standing the ways that risk models can and cannot be used
is clearly one of the most significant challenges facing
financial institutions and their supervisors today. The
market risk capital requirements may further this under-
standing by providing a test case for the supervisory use of
internal models.ENDNOTES
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1. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1994) for a
description of the risk-based capital standards that apply to state member
banks and bank holding companies. The standards for state nonmember
banks and for national banks (administered by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,
respectively) are essentially identical.
2. Readers interested in the details of the market risk capital
requirements should see Basle Committee on Banking Supervision
(1996a) and U.S. Department of the Treasury, Federal Reserve System,
and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (1996). The amended Basle
Accord contains a second method for calculating market risk capital
requirements that is not included in the U.S. guidelines. This second
approach—the “standardized approach”—requires an institution to
apply certain uniform techniques to calculate the capital charge for
market risk. It is also important to distinguish the internal models
approach contained in the U.S. guidelines from the so-called
precommitment approach, which has been released for discussion by the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and is being explored
in a pilot project by the New York Clearing House (see Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System [1995]). Under the
precommitment approach, banks would have latitude to specify the
amount of capital they wished to allocate to market risk, subject to
penalties if subsequent trading losses exceeded this precommitted
amount. This approach is one of several alternative methods that have
been suggested for determining banks’ capital requirements. For another,
see Estrella (1995), who proposes capital supervision based on banks’
internally determined “optimal” capital levels, in combination with a
simple supervisory minimum.
3. The U.S. capital standards have recently been amended to require
that a bank’s capital be adequate to cover its overall exposure to interest
rate risk. This determination is made as part of a bank’s supervisory ex-
amination, rather than through a formal minimum capital requirement.
4. The exceptions are derivative positions, which continue to be subject
to counterparty credit risk capital requirements.
5. As of the end of 1996, seventeen commercial banks met these
criteria. These seventeen banks held nearly 98 percent of the trading
positions (assets plus liabilities) held by all U.S. commercial banks. In
addition, seventeen bank holding companies met the criteria, including
the holding companies associated with fourteen of the seventeen banks.
The actual number of institutions that are ultimately subject to the
market risk capital requirements may differ from these figures, for two
reasons: supervisors can, at their own discretion, include or exclude
particular institutions, and institutions have the option to become
subject to the capital requirements with supervisory approval.
6. See Jorion (1996) for a more detailed discussion of value-at-risk
models. Hendricks (1996) compares the performance of several types of
value-at-risk models.
7. To be precise, the capital charge for general market risk is equal to
the greater of the sixty-day average value-at-risk estimate times the
scaling factor or the previous day’s value-at-risk estimate. As a practical
matter, the previous day’s value-at-risk estimate should rarely, if ever,
exceed the sixty-day average times three.
8. Of course, some positions could take longer than ten days to liquidate.
The extent to which a ten-day holding period is a suitable average would
obviously depend on the characteristics of an individual portfolio.
9. Gamma risk arises from the fact that the sensitivity of an option’s
value to changes in the value of the option’s underlying instrument will
vary as the value of the underlying instrument changes.
10. Note, however, that the existing empirical evidence does not
suggest substantial differences in the performance of value-at-risk models
with varying observations periods.
11. For a full discussion of the use of backtesting in the market risk
capital requirements, see Basle Committee on Banking Supervision
(1996b). For a discussion of the statistical properties of backtesting and
other methods of evaluating the accuracy of value-at-risk models, see
Kupiec (1995) and Lopez (1997).
12. For banks whose value-at-risk models do not adequately incorporate
specific risk, debt and equity positions in the trading portfolio are subject
to a set of standardized specific risk charges, which apply to both long
and short positions. These charges are added to the value-at-risk-based
general market risk charge. The standardized charges are in many cases
significantly lower than the original credit risk capital charges. For
instance, an investment-grade corporate bond, which would have been
subject to an 8 percent credit risk capital charge under the earlier
guidelines, is now subject to a 1.6 percent specific risk charge.
13. There is a concern that measures of recent price variability may not
provide a complete guide to the potential risk inherent in some
positions—for example, illiquid positions that trade infrequently. This
concern, together with the existence of differing market practices in this
regard, has been a factor in shaping the interim approach to specific risk.
14. The institutions cited in Table 2 are used for illustrative purposes
only. They do not represent an exhaustive list of the bank holding
companies that reported value-at-risk estimates in their 1996 annual
reports.12 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / DECEMBER 1997 NOTES
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